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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jason Godwin appeals from his Judgment of Conviction. Following a jury trial, he was
convicted of the second degree murder of Kyle Anderson. On appeal, he raises six issues.
First, Mr. Godwin asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In an
issue of first impression in the State of Idaho, Mr. Godwin asserts, after confessing to killing
Mr. Anderson, his once voluntary questioning became a custodial interrogation, requiring
Miranda1 warnings. Mr. Godwin was eventually provided Miranda warnings; however, these
delayed warnings were only provided after he confessed and was subject to significant additional
questioning. He argues that this ask first, warn later approach was impermissible, intentional, and
should result in the suppression of all of his statements made after his first confession.
Next,  he  asserts  the  district  court  erred  in  prohibiting  the  admission  of  relevant  victim
character evidence, admitted through opinion or reputation testimony, unless Mr. Godwin was
able to prove he knew about Mr. Anderson’s reputation for violence and aggression. This Idaho
Rule of Evidence 404 and 405 evidence was admissible whether or not Mr. Godwin was aware
of Mr. Anderson’s reputation. As such, it was error to exclude the evidence and the error requires
the reversal of Mr. Godwin’s conviction.
Mr. Godwin asserts this Court should overrule or decline to follow State v. Custodio, 136
Idaho 197 (Ct. App. 2001). He asserts Custodio’s holding that specific instances of a victim’s
conduct are not admissible under Rule 405(b) because a victim’s propensity for violence or
aggressiveness does not constitute an essential element of a self-defense claim has proven unjust.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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He asserts Idaho should adopt a broader approach to Rule 405(b) and employ a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether specific act evidence is essential to a self-defense claim.
Furthermore, he asserts the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on justifiable
homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1) was fundamental error, essentially lowering the State’s burden
of proving the homicide was unlawful.
Additionally, Mr. Godwin asserts the State committed prosecutorial misconduct which
deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty to see that Mr. Godwin had a fair
trial by engaged in vouching behavior. Mr. Godwin contends the misconduct committed in his
case constituted fundamental error and the error is not harmless.
Finally,  Mr.  Godwin  asserts  the  errors  are  not  harmless  or,  alternatively,  the  errors
amount to cumulative error, depriving him of his right to a fair trial.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s assertions to the contrary.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were articulated in Mr. Godwin’s




I. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Godwin’s motion to suppress?
II. Did  the  district  court  err  when  it  ruled  that  Mr.  Godwin  could  only  present  opinion  or
reputation evidence of Mr. Anderson’s violent and/or aggressive character after showing
that Mr. Godwin was aware of Mr. Anderson’s propensity for violence?
III. Should this Court overrule State v. Custodio and hold that specific instances of a victim’s
conduct, showing a violent character, can be an essential element of a self-defense claim
and are admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 405?
IV. Did the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on justifiable homicide pursuant to
I.C. § 18-4009(1) amount to fundamental error?
V. Did  the  State  violate  Mr.  Godwin’s  right  to  a  fair  trial  by  committing  prosecutorial
misconduct?




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Godwin’s Motion To Suppress
On appeal, Mr. Godwin argued the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
statements made during a custodial interrogation because Officer Hewson’s delayed Miranda
warnings after Mr. Godwin’s first confession did not cure the Fifth Amendment violation. (App.
Br., pp.10–34.) The State responded. (Resp. Br., pp.5–13.) Mr. Godwin now replies to some, but
not all, of the State’s arguments.
The State first asserted Mr. Godwin’s argument was not preserved for appeal. (Resp.
Br., pp.7–8.) Mr. Godwin disagrees. In Mr. Godwin’s memorandum in support of his motion to
suppress, he identified two “grounds” for the motion:  whether his confession was voluntary and
whether he invoked his Miranda rights. (R., p.179.) In the second Miranda-based argument,
Mr. Godwin also contended, “having made a confession,” Officer “Hewson had made a decision
that [Mr.] Godwin was not going to be leaving the station.” (R., p.189.) Mr. Godwin continued:
[Mr.] Godwin should have been read his Miranda rights at the outset of the
interrogation. Had that been done, the defendant would have invoked those rights
and, as he stated when they were first mentioned, not waive them. However,
having already made statements while in custody, the defendant was trapped.
The circumstantial evidence supports the finding that [Mr.] Godwin was
never free to leave and would have been stopped had he tried to do so. . . . The
only “suspect” referenced in the investigative reports is [Mr.] Godwin. Whether
he was told so or not,  [Mr.]  Godwin was the focus of the investigation. He was
arrested after the interrogation ended.
For these foregoing reasons, [Mr.] Godwin’s statements to law
enforcement authorities were the product of police coercion elicited through the
use of overreaching techniques. Under the totality of the circumstances, his
statements were not voluntary.
(R., pp.187–88 (emphasis added).) Mr. Godwin then expanded on this argument at the
suppression motion hearing. He argued he was subject to a custodial interrogation. (Tr., p.153,
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L.19–p.160, L.11.) He maintained that a reasonable person in his situation would not feel free to
leave once “something changed” in the interview. (Tr., p.158, L.1–p.159, L.22.) Then, in ruling
on the motion to suppression, the district court determined Mr. Godwin was not in custody.
(R., pp.505–08.) The district court did not reach the issue of the adequacy of the Miranda
warnings. For the district court, the custody determination resolved the issue—if Mr. Godwin
was not in custody, no Miranda warnings  were  required,  so  whether  those  warnings  were
sufficient was beside the point. Accordingly, Mr. Godwin first argued on appeal that he was
subject to a custodial interrogation, which required Miranda warnings. (App. Br., pp.17–25.) The
establishment of a custodial interrogation does not end the inquiry, however. Once Mr. Godwin
showed  he  was  subject  to  a  custodial  interrogation,  he  also  had  to  show  that  the Miranda
warnings were inadequate. (App. Br., pp.25–34.) Mr. Godwin was obligated to address this issue
on appeal because it is part and parcel of the custodial interrogation issue. If Mr. Godwin had
argued that he was subject to a custodial interrogation, but not argued the Miranda warnings
were inadequate, he would have essentially waived this issue. The adequacy of the Miranda
warnings is a crucial part of a custodial interrogation analysis. Therefore, Mr. Godwin maintains
that he has not raised a new issue on appeal, but rather has argued all aspects of an issue raised
below.
Next, the State submits this Court should reject Mr. Godwin’s “novel proposition” that a
confession to serious criminal conduct transforms voluntary police questioning into a custodial
situation. (Resp. Br., p.10.) Although Mr. Godwin disputes his position is novel—considering
several other courts have ruled in his favor—he recognizes this is a matter of first impression.
(App. Br., pp.20–23.) To this end, Mr. Godwin also disputes the State’s contention that State v.
James, 148 Idaho 574 (2010), has rejected his proposition. (Resp. Br., p.10.) In James, a police
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officer told three occupants of car that if none of them “fessed up” to the contraband found in the
car, he would “arrest them all.” Id. at 575. This Court determined “the threat of lawful arrest
alone does not transform non-custodial questioning into the functional equivalent of arrest,
requiring Miranda warnings.” Id. at 578. A threat of lawful arrest, however, is not the same as a
confession to homicide. One is a claim by law enforcement of a future act; the other is an
admission by the suspect to the commission of a serious offense. A reasonable person would not
believe an officer’s threat or warning that he will arrest in the future to be a current restraint on
freedom of movement. On the other hand, a reasonable person would believe his admission to an
officer, at the police station, to the commission of the very crime that the officer is investigating
to cause restraint in his freedom of movement. That individual would not expect to leave the
police station freely. Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, James has not addressed the issue at
bar. As argued here and in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Godwin maintains that his confession to
homicide, in and of itself, or the facts of his interrogation collectively created a custodial setting.
(App. Br., pp.20–25.)
Finally,  Mr.  Godwin  challenges  the  State’s  claim  that  any  error  in  the  district  court’s
denial of his motion to suppress was harmless. This is absurd. The State points to a hypothetical
trial in which Mr. Godwin’s confessions were excluded, but then introduced to the jury for
impeachment purposes after Mr. Godwin testified in his defense. This argument relies on
speculation upon even more speculation. Moreover, it is not the test for harmless error. The
harmless error standard examines the effect of the error “upon the guilty verdict in the case at
hand.” State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 919 (2015) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
279 (1993)). Here, the State has not shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this error “did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010) (quoting
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Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Far from it. It is pure conjecture from the State
that Mr. Godwin would have testified in his defense had his confessions been properly
suppressed. It is also pure speculation from the State that the prosecutor would have used
Mr. Godwin’s confessions for impeachment purposes. The amount of guesswork needed to
evaluate the State’s position demonstrates why the harmless error standard considers the impact
of the error upon the actual trial, not what could have happened absent the error. And what
happened in this case was the prosecutor’s presentation of Mr. Godwin’s multiple confessions
and use of those confessions to prove its case. First, the prosecutor told the jury in opening
statements that “[t]his audiotaped interview is very important.” (Tr., p.500, L.23.) The prosecutor
outlined this evidence in advance for the jury in his opening statement. (Tr., p.495, Ls.6–12,
p.496, Ls.17–21, p.500, L.1–p.502, L.4, p.505, L.23–p.506, L.3.) Next, the prosecutor played the
interrogation recordings for the jury in its case-in-chief. (Tr., p.848, Ls.9–10, p.851, Ls.7–8.)
Lastly, the prosecutor referred back to Mr. Godwin’s confessions in closing argument. The
prosecutor told the jury, “We know that [Mr. Godwin] lied over and over to Detective Hewson
when he gave that interview. That interview was the next morning. Everything was fresh in
Jason Godwin’s mind, and he lied. He said lie after lie in that interview.” (Tr., p.1137, Ls.20–24;
see also Tr., p.1177, Ls.14–15 (“We know that he has lied before. He is not credible. He
admitted to many lies.”).) The prosecutor discussed the interrogation with Officer Hewson and
the reasonable inferences from it multiple times. (Tr., p.1137, L.20–p.1139, L.25, p.1144, L.22–
p.1145, L.6, p.1147, L.21–p.1148, L.19.) Based on the actual events of the trial, the State cannot
show the erroneous admission of Mr. Godwin’s confessions did not contribute to the jury’s
guilty verdict. The State’s proposed “hypothetical trial” approach (which is not supported by any
legal authority) is the improper standard for harmless error. This Court should reject the State’s
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new standard and examine the impact of the error on the verdict actually obtained. Using the
appropriate standard, the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt the error was harmless.
Based on the argument herein and those contained in Mr. Godwin’s Appellant’s Brief, he
asserts the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress, and this Court should reverse
or vacate the district court’s order denying his motion and remand this case for further
proceedings.
II.
The District Court Erred When It Ruled That Mr. Godwin Could Only Present Opinion Or
Reputation Evidence Of Mr. Anderson’s Violent And/Or Aggressive Character After Showing
That Mr. Godwin Was Aware Of Mr. Anderson’s Propensity For Violence
On appeal, Mr. Godwin argued the district court erred when it denied Mr. Godwin the
opportunity to present evidence of the character of Mr. Anderson by requiring Mr. Godwin to
show that he had prior knowledge of Mr. Anderson’s reputation in order to satisfy the erroneous
foundational requirement for admissibility. The State has asserted, in a very brief response, that
Mr. Godwin “failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when, properly following
controlling precedent, it granted the state’s motion in limine.” (Resp. Br., p.14.) It appears that
the  State  believed  that  Mr.  Godwin  had  raised,  in  Issue  II,  an  issue  with  the  district  court’s
determination that specific instances of Mr. Anderson’s conduct were inadmissible.2 (Resp.
2 Mr. Godwin acknowledges a typo in the introduction of the issue where the term “specific
instances” was used instead of the proper terms “opinion or reputation evidence.” (App.
Br., p.34.) However, the remainder of the sentence (referring to character evidence), as well as
the issue statement and substantive portion of the issue, clearly designate the issue as an error in
interpreting I.R.E. 404(a) and prohibiting the introduction of character or opinion evidence
unless Mr. Godwin could show that he had prior knowledge of Mr. Anderson’s character. (App.
Br., pp.34–39.)
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Br., pp.13–14.) However, this was plainly not the issue raised.3 Mr. Godwin asserted error in the
district court’s ruling that opinion or reputation evidence was admissible only if Mr. Godwin was
aware of Mr. Anderson’s reputation. (App. Br., pp.34–39.) The State failed to address the issue
presented. As such, the State has forfeited their right to present argument on this issue.
Additionally, the State has failed to meet their burden in proving that the error was harmless. See
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
III.
This Court Should Overrule State v. Custodio And Hold Specific Instances Of A Victim’s
Conduct, Showing A Violent Character, Can Be An Essential Element Of A Self-Defense Claim
And Are Admissible Under Idaho Rule Of Evidence 405
 On appeal, Mr. Godwin asserted State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197 (Ct. App. 2001) and
its progeny were incorrectly decided and are patently unfair to criminal defendants. He
respectfully requested that this Court either revisit and overturn this line of cases, if assigned to
the Court of Appeals, or to decline to follow the cases, if assigned the Idaho Supreme Court, and
to hold that under Rule 405(b) specific instances of a victim’s violent or aggressive conduct can
be admissible as proof of their character and can constitute an essential element of a self-defense
claim. The State’s arguments to the contrary are unremarkable. As such, Mr. Godwin does not
provide any additional argument on this issue and relies on the arguments provided in the
Appellant’s Brief. (See App. Br., pp.39–51.)
3 Mr. Godwin’s arguments regarding the admissibility of specific instances of conduct and the
request to overrule State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197 (Ct. App. 2001) can be found in Issue III.
10
IV.
The District Court’s Failure To Instruct The Jury On Justifiable Homicide Pursuant To I.C. § 18-
4009(1) Amounted To Fundamental Error
Mr. Godwin also argued on appeal that a reasonable view of the evidence supported an
instruction on justifiable homicide and the district court’s failure to give this instruction
constituted fundamental error. (App. Br., pp.57–76.) The State’s arguments in response are not
persuasive.
As an initial matter, the State argues this error is not preserved. (Resp. Br., pp.21–23.)
That is correct. But Mr. Godwin never argued otherwise on appeal. Mr. Godwin raised this claim
pursuant to the fundamental error doctrine. (App. Br., pp.71–75.) Accordingly, the State’s
position that this Court should hold a party waives an instructional error if not raised below, that
Mr. Godwin waived this error, and that Mr. Godwin invited this error miss the mark. Moreover,
the State’s assertion that instructional errors are waived if not preserved would eliminate the
fundamental error doctrine as applied to jury instructions. This argument is unsupported by law.
This Court reaffirmed in State v. Hall, 161 Idaho 413 (2016), that an alleged error pertaining to a
jury  instruction  can  be  raised  for  the  first  time  on  appeal  as  fundamental  error. Id. at 422–23.
Mr. Godwin has done that here. (See App. Br., pp.57–76.) As such, Mr. Godwin submits this
Court can review this assignment of error on appeal.
Next, the State’s argument that Mr. Anderson’s conduct towards Mr. Godwin was not an
“actual, ongoing attack” is misplaced. An actual, ongoing attack is not defined by battery or
assault, as argued by the State. (Resp. Br., pp.25–26.) There are no such limitations in I.C. § 18-
4009(1). Idaho Code § 18-4009(1) simply provides that homicide is justifiable “[w]hen resisting
any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon
any person.” Mr. Godwin maintains the act of pointing a gun directly at another person and
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cocking the hammer is an attempt to murder, commit a felony, or do some great bodily injury. It
is an actual, ongoing attack. (See App. Br., pp.63–66.) The State’s argument that Mr. Godwin
had to wait until the gun was discharged to respond would dispel the need to defend oneself
altogether. It should go without saying, but, if the gun was discharged, Mr. Godwin would have
been shot. At that point, the danger is abated, and the privilege of self-defense has expired. See
Hall, 161 Idaho at 424. Simply put, a deceased or gravely injured person cannot defend oneself
from the harm that already occurred. The State’s argument is illogical and contravenes the right
of self-defense.
For all other issues, including whether this issue satisfies the fundamental error standard,
Mr. Godwin respectfully refers this Court to his Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.71–76.)
V.
The State Violated Mr. Godwin’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial
Misconduct
Mr. Godwin argued the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which requires the
vacation of his conviction. (App. Br., pp.66–74.) Response is necessary to address the State’s
assertions that he “cherry-picked” quotes and, to the extent the prosecutor’s comments amounted
to misconduct, there was no prejudice because “the prosecutor did not convey any impression
that he was aware of evidence that had been withheld from the jury.” (Resp. Br., pp.32–35.) The
State’s arguments are flawed.
First, the State asserts Mr. Godwin “cherry-picked” the quotes he relied upon and took
them out of context. (Resp. Br., pp.32–34.) Mr. Godwin adamantly denies this allegation and
asserts that by quoting only the relevant portions, he has, in no way, manipulated the words or
intent of the prosecutor’s closing.
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Furhter, the State has taken issue with Mr. Godwin’s quoted excerpt:
Now, Amanda Jones is not the most sophisticated witness, but I would
submit  to  you,  I  don’t  think  she  came off  as  a  schemer,  a  planner.  She  was  not
sophisticated, but I would submit to you and you judge her testimony. I would
submit  to  you  that  she  was  telling  the  truth, and that something you have to
decide, not me.
(Tr., p.1142, Ls.17–22 (emphasis added).) The next sentence includes the following, “And what
Mr. Monson and I tell you is not evidence, but the evidence proves that Mr. Godwin is guilty of
second degree murder.” (Tr., p.1142, Ls.22–24.) The State asserts the quoted material merely
shows that the prosecutor was acting appropriately by reminding the jury that they have to make
credibility determinations and that the prosecutor’s statements were not evidence. (Resp.
Br., p.32.) The State’s assertion is disingenuous as it relies on only the proper portions of the
closing argument and ignores the nefarious portions, employing the very tactic of which it
accuses Mr. Godwin. Regardless, the State’s reading ignores the additional statement asserting
that the prosecutor believed Ms. Jones. A prosecutor should not be allowed to commit
misconduct and avoid the repercussions by also peppering his argument with appropriate
statements. This proverbial wink does little, if anything, to eradicate the suggestion that the jury
should believe the prosecutor’s view of the evidence over its own.
Next, the State takes issue with another quote in Mr. Godwin’s brief:
. . . And Amanda Jones, she’s not a sophisticated witness, but I believe she was a
credible witness. Testimony from here was Mr. Goodwin, after he shoots and
kills  Mr.  Anderson,  runs  up  to  here.  She’s  on  her  knees,  and  he’s  got  the  gun
pointed at her head. Why would she make that up? What incentive does she have
to say that? The shooting is over. Her boyfriend is dead. I mean, when you talk
about credibility, what reason does she have to lie about that? I mean, it doesn’t
help – it doesn’t help the shooting incident. It’s something that happened to her
and  she’s  telling  you,  but  what  I’m  saying  is  if  someone  --  if  you  believe  that,
which I think was credible, it is totally inconsistent with self-defense, and these
are factors for you to consider.
(App. Br., pp.68–69 (quoting Tr., p.1145, L.13–p.1146, L.2 (emphasis added).) The State asserts
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the quote does not amount to misconduct because it was merely a belief regarding credibility
based on inferences from the evidence presented at trial. (Resp. Br., p.33.) In support of this
argument the State cites State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003), as holding, “[i]t is not
improper for the prosecutor to express a belief that a witness is credible when his comment is
based on inferences from evidence presented at trial.” (Resp. Br., p.33.) However, Sheahan
actually states, “[i]t is improper, however, for the prosecution to express a personal belief as to
the credibility of witnesses, unless the comment is based solely on inferences from evidence
presented at trial.” Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280. Although presumably acknowledging that the
prosecutor was expressing a personal belief regarding the credibility of Ms. Jones, the State
failed to argue that said belief was “based solely” on inferences from the evidence. (Resp.
Br., p.33.) As such, the State’s argument is lacking legal support.
Later, the State, using the appropriate legal standard, asserted the quote referring to
Mr. Lynch was proper when looking at all of the evidence. (Resp. Br., p.33.) However, the
statement by the prosecutor appears to rely on his opinion, not upon evidence. The prosecutor
did not attempt to rein in his statement regarding Mr. Lynch by tying it to the evidence. (See
generally Tr., p.1134, L.10–p.1150, L.18.) Instead, the prosecution again vouched for the
credibility of the State’s witnesses by expressing personal opinion:
Beau Lynch. . . . What motive does he have to lie? Judge his testimony.
He was scared. He was scared to sit up there and tell the truth about his former
boss, a friend. And I think he was scared, and I think he was nervous, but
even with all that, even with all that he still told the truth.  And  these
credibility questions are what you have to answer.
(Tr., p.1143, Ls.9–19 (emphasis added).) Further, making bold statements about credibility and
then reminding the jury that they get to make the determination is insufficient to cure the
suggestion provided by the prosecutor’s inducement to trust the government’s judgment.
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The State then argues the prosecutor’s final statement to the jury was taken out of
context. (Resp. Br., p.34.) The quoted portion was the last statement made during the rebuttal
closing argument: “. . . And I would submit that the evidence that the witnesses that the State put
on are credible, and, again, ladies and gentlemen, the State would ask you to find Mr. Goodwin
guilty of second degree murder.” (Tr., p.1177, L.15–19 (emphasis added).) It is true that the
statement came after a review of some of the evidence presented; however, there was once again
no attempt to directly tie the statement to evidence presented or ensure that the jury was aware
the statement was based solely on the evidence. Instead it left the jury, in the final moments
before deliberation, with the impression that the prosecutor believed its evidence and witnesses
were credible and impliedly suggested the jury should trust the prosecutor’s judgment. These
statements amount to prosecutorial misconduct and present a due process violation. As noted by
the United States Supreme Court:
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus
jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence.
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985).
Finally, the State has asserted that there was no prejudice because “the prosecutor did not
convey any impression that he was aware of evidence that had been withheld from the jury.”
(Resp. Br., pp.32–35.) The State’s assertion is misplaced. Even if the prosecutor’s vouching
comments  did  not  imply  there  was  additional  evidence,  they  nonetheless  posed  the  second
danger discussed in Young––that the jury would trust the Government’s judgment rather than its
own.
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As such, Mr. Godwin maintains that the improper comments made by the prosecution
during closing arguments, constituting misconduct, likely influenced the jury and, as result, this
Court must vacate his conviction.
VI.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Godwin’s Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived
Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Although the majority of the State’s argument concerning cumulative error is
unremarkable and does not require a response, it should be noted the State has cited an incorrect
harmless error standard. The State asserted that any possible accumulation of error cannot be
harmless because “the evidence of Godwin’s guilt was overwhelming.” (Resp. Br., pp.36–37.)
However, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the Idaho harmless error standard is the test
articulated in Chapman:  “To hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence
complained of contributed to the conviction.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967);
see State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). As such, in determining whether the errors are
harmless, the appellate court must use a test of whether there was no reasonable possibility that
such errors contributed to the conviction, not whether the evidence was overwhelming.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Godwin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this
case for a new trial.
DATED this 29th day of August, 2018.
/s/ Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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